The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002)
AbstractWe extend Jackson and Watts's (2002) result on the coincidence of S-stochastically stable and core stable networks from marriage problems to roommate problems. In particular, we show that the existence of a side-optimal core stable network, on which the proof of Jackson and Watts (2002) hinges, is not crucial for their result.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 694.07.
Date of creation: 13 Apr 2007
Date of revision:
core; networks; roommate problems; stochastic stability;
Other versions of this item:
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl, 2007. "The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002)," Working Papers 296, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Walzl, Markus, 2007. "The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002)," Research Memoranda 012, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Walzl, Markus, 2007. "The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002)," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2007-04-21 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2007-04-21 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-04-21 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Random paths to stability in the roommate problem,"
0102-65, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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1044, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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- Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992.
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
- Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-80, November.
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