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Unmarried Births: Accounting and Equilibrium Analysis"

Author

Listed:
  • John Kennes

    (Aarhus University)

  • John Knowles

    (Simon Fraser University)

Abstract

The share of births to unmarried women in the U.S. rose well above 30% in the 1990s, despite unmarried women having greater access to abortion and improved birth control. We show that an equilibrium matching model in which unmarried couples behave co-operatively can explain 97% of the rise in the UMB ratio as the response to a combination of well-documented shocks: rising divorce rates, access to abortion, and improved contraception. Equilibrium interactions among these factors are important; had the marital surplus remained constant, very little change in unmarried births would have occurred. We also find that reforms reversing accessibility of birth control or abortion would on their own do little to reverse these social trends. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • John Kennes & John Knowles, 2024. "Unmarried Births: Accounting and Equilibrium Analysis"," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 52, pages 84-109, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:20-365
    DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2023.12.001
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Search/matching; Unmarried births; Household formation; Shot-gun weddings; Marriage; Fertility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical
    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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