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Marital Stability With Committed Couples: A Revealed Preference Analysis

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  • Mikhail Freer
  • Khushboo Surana

Abstract

We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can only divorce upon mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potential of the characterization for identifying intrahousehold consumption patterns. We show that when there is no price variation for private goods between potential couples, it is only possible to identify intrahousehold resource allocations for non-committed couples. Simulation exercises using household data drawn from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) panel support our theoretical findings. Our results show that in the presence of price variation, the empirical implications of marital stability can be used for identifying household consumption allocations for both committed and non-committed couples.

Suggested Citation

  • Mikhail Freer & Khushboo Surana, 2021. "Marital Stability With Committed Couples: A Revealed Preference Analysis," Papers 2110.10781, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2110.10781
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