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Marriage Markets and Divorce Laws

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Author Info
Imran Rasul

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Abstract

This paper develops a model of search and learning in marriage markets to analyze how a liberalization of divorce laws affects marriage market outcomes. In particular we analyze how the move from mutual consent divorce to unilateral divorce affects marriage rates, the composition of those who marry, and divorce rates, under the assumption that households cannot reach Coasean bargains. The analysis highlights the distinction between the effects on the existing stock of married couples (a pipeline effect) and the effects on newly married couples (a selection effect). Although unilateral divorce laws increase divorce rates for those already married at the time of the law change, the change to unilateral divorce can cause those married to be better matched than those previously married under mutual consent divorce laws. Hence a change to unilateral divorce can cause a fall in the steady-state divorce rate. The results help interpret and reconcile much of the current empirical literature in this field. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewj008
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.

Volume (Year): 22 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 30-69
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:22:y:2006:i:1:p:30-69

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Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
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  1. Domenico Tabasso, 2009. "With or Without You: Time Use Complementarities and Divorce Rate in the US," Economics Discussion Papers 674, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Zvika Neeman & Andrew F. Newman & Claudia Olivetti, 2008. "Are Career Women Good for Marriage?," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-167, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Akiko Maruyama & Takashi Shimizu & Kazuhiro Yamamoto, 2009. "Exit and Voice in a Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 09-04-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised Mar 2009. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Martin Halla & Johann Scharler, 2008. "Marriage, Divorce and Interstate Risk Sharing," NRN working papers 2008-03, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Iyigun, Murat & Weiss, Yoram, 2008. "An Assignment Model with Divorce and Remarriage," IZA Discussion Papers 3892, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  6. Gustavo J Bobonis, 2009. "The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on Marriage and Divorce," Working Papers tecipa-359, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Pierre-André Chiappori & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2007. "Public Goods, Transferable Utility and Divorce Laws," IZA Discussion Papers 2646, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  8. Betsey Stevenson, 2008. "Divorce Law and Women's Labor Supply," NBER Working Papers 14346, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Alessandro Balestrino & Cinzia Ciardi & Claudio Mammini, 2008. "On the Causes and Consequences of Divorce," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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