In this article we provide a simple model of the marriage market where singles search for spouses. In our model economy men and women live for many years and they differ in their survival probabilities, in their fecundity, and in their earnings. We show that modelling the marriage decision in a very simple model economy is sufficient to account for much of the observed marriage behavior in the United States in the year 2000. We conclude that gender differences in fecundity are all important in accounting for marriage behavior, and that differences in earnings matter little. We also conclude that, even though they are in short supply, the market power of fecund women is not enough for them to demand compensation in all cases. And that studying the marriage decision without modelling explicitly the roles played by age and by fecundity, as has been typically done by the previous literature, makes little sense.
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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number
we080804.
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Bergstrom, T. & Bagnali, M., 1991.
"Courtship as a Waiting Game,"
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91-3, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, .
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Bergstrom, T. & Bagnoli, M., 1990.
"Courtship as a Waiting Game,"
Papers
90-12, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
S. Rao Aiyagari & Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner, 2000.
"On the State of the Union,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 213-244, April.
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