José Angel Silva (Universidad de Alicante) Oscar Volij (Brown University) Ronel Elul (Brown University)
Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of the gender wage up. The difference in earningsis a consequence of a demographic regularity -that men tend to marry younger women- whichlimits women´s labor mobility. However, couples are always free not to marry, and do so only if itis in each´s self-interest. In our model, marriage is beneficial because the joint consumption is a household public good.The intrafamily allocation of resources is determined via noncooperative bargaining; this leads tointeresting interactions between the game played by husband and wife on the other hand, and thecompetitive environment in which they are immersed on the other. One example of this is thegender gap
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Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number
1997-20.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Maxim Engers & Steven Stern, 2002.
"Long-Term Care and Family Bargaining,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 73-114, February.
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