A Search Model of Marriage and Divorce
AbstractThis paper analyses long term partnership formation in a marriage market in which individuals continue to search for partners while matched. Individuals prefer relationships which offer more instantaneous utility but they also prefer more stable relationships. A relationship is more stable for one partner if there is less chance that the other partner will leave. An individual is more inclined to leave a relationship which offers less instantaneous utility and less stability. Since both partners are making these evaluations, the stability of the relationship for one companion depends on the stability of the relationship for the other and as such, separation rates are endogenous. It is shown that these feedback effects in search strategies generate a new type of multiple equilibria in which particular matches can be either stable or unstable depending on individuals beliefs. (Copyright: Elsevier)
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.
Volume (Year): 6 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Review of Economic Dynamics Academic Press Editorial Office 525 "B" Street, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/review.htm
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Peter A. Diamond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 282-316, Spring.
- Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1998.
"Assortive Matching and Search,"
98-09, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1997. "Assortative Matching and Search," Working papers 97-2a, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1997. "Assortative Matching and Search," Working papers 97-2b, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Kenneth Burdett & Ryoichi Imai & Randall Wright, 2004. "Unstable Relationships," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 0(1), pages 1.
- Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979.
"Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-90, October.
- Jan Eeckhout, 1996.
"Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity,"
STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series
315, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Wright, Randall, 1986. "Job Search and Cyclical Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(1), pages 38-55, February.
- P. Diamond, 1980.
"Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium,"
268, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Lones Smith, 2006. "The Marriage Model with Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1124-1146, December.
- Burdett, Kenneth & Coles, Melvyn G, 1999. "Long-Term Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(456), pages F307-34, June.
- Pieter A. Gautier & Michael Svarer & Coen N. Teulings, 2007. "Sin City?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-021/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Ricardo Lagos, 2006.
"A model of job and worker flows,"
358, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Mario Vozar, 2010. "The Effect of Time in a Multi-Dimensional Marriage Market Model," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp417, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
- Pieter A. Gautier & Michael Svarer & Coen N. Teulings, 2007.
CAM Working Papers
2007-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
- Gautier, Pieter A & Svarer, Michael & Teulings, Coen N, 2007. "Sin City?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6170, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gautier, Pieter & Svarer, Michael & Teulings, Coen, 2007. "Sin City?," IZA Discussion Papers 2632, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Pieter A. Gautier & Michael Svarer & Coen N. Teulings, 2007. "Sin City?," Economics Working Papers 2007-01, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Lindner Pomerantz, Renana, 2012. "Assimilation through Marriage," IZA Discussion Papers 6831, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Giolito, Eugenio P., 2004.
"A Search Model of Marriage with Differential Fecundity,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1082, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Eugenio Giolito, 2004. "A Search Model of Marriage with Differential Fecundity," Labor and Demography 0402007, EconWPA.
- Eugenio P. Giolito, 2010. "On Population Structure and Marriage Dynamics," 2010 Meeting Papers 1178, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Coles, Melvyn & Francesconi, Marco, 2007. "On the Emergence of Toyboys: Equilibrium Matching with Ageing and Uncertain Careers," IZA Discussion Papers 2612, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Gil S. Epstein & Renana Lindner Pomerantz, 2012. "Assimilation through Marriage," CReAM Discussion Paper Series 1220, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London.
- Gil S. Epstein & Renana Lindner Pomerantz, 2012. "Assimilation through Marriage," Working Papers 2012-11, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.