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Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

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  • Batabyal, Amitrajeet
  • Yoo, Seung Jick

Abstract

In this note we study a simple game model of effort application by two individuals (1 and 2) who wish to have an arranged marriage. We first specify the net utility function of individual i as a function of this individual’s own effort and the effort applied by individual j,i≠j, in three distinct cases. Next, we compute the ith individual’s best response function. Finally, we analyze effort application by two identical pairs of individuals who are located in two different nations. In the first (second) nation, arranged marriages are uncommon (common) and hence it is relatively difficult (straightforward) for the two individuals to apply and coordinate effort. We explain why the net utility of the pair wishing to have an arranged marriage in the first nation is likely to be much lower than the corresponding net utility of the pair in the second nation.

Suggested Citation

  • Batabyal, Amitrajeet & Yoo, Seung Jick, 2016. "Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," MPRA Paper 74745, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:74745
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74745/1/MPRA_paper_74745.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 1998. "Aspects of Arranged Marriages and the Theory of Markov Decision Processes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 241-253, December.
    6. Batabyal, Amitrajeet, 2016. "Making an arranged marriage work: A game-theoretic analysis," MPRA Paper 71199, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2016.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arranged Marriage; Effort; Net Utility; Static Game; Strategic Complements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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