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Marriage, Divorce, and Interstate Risk Sharing

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  • Martin Halla
  • Johann Scharler

Abstract

In this paper we study the importance of marriage for interstate risk sharing. We find that US states in which married couples account for a higher share of the population are less exposed to state-specific output shocks. Thus, marriages do not just improve the allocation of risk at the individual level, but also have implications for the allocation of risk at the more aggregated state-level. Quantitatively, the impact of marriage on interstate risk sharing varies over divorce regimes.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01673.x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 114 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 55-78

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:114:y:2012:i:1:p:55-78

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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442

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Cited by:
  1. Tammi, Timo, 2013. "Dictator game giving and norms of redistribution: Does giving in the dictator game parallel with the supporting of income redistribution in the field?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 44-48.
  2. Olivier Donni, 2012. "Overinvestment in Marriage-Specific Capital," THEMA Working Papers 2012-29, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  3. Donni, Olivier, 2014. "Over-investment in marriage-specific capital," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 34-43.

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