Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American Family
AbstractThis paper investigates the impact of no-fault divorce laws on marriage and divorce in the United States. I propose a theory that captures the key stylized facts of the rising then declining divorce rates and the apparent convergence of divorce rates across the different divorce regimes. The empirical results suggest that a shift from fault to no-fault divorce increased the odds of divorcing for those couples who married before the shift. The analysis further suggests that those couples who marry after the shift to a no-fault regime, in turn, sort themselves better upon marriage, which offsets the direct effect of the law on divorce rates. Consistent with that selectivity argument, after a switch to a no-fault divorce regime, women get married later in life. These results hold for the law that governs property division and spousal support. The law that governs divorce grounds does not seem to matter significantly.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number tecipa-245.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 10 Jul 2006
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario
Phone: (416) 978-5283
divorce; marriage; law; no-fault; fault; property; grounds; surprise;
Other versions of this item:
- Stéphane Mechoulan, 2006. "Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American Family," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 143-174, 01.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cáceres-Delpiano, Julio & Giolito, Eugenio P., 2008. "How Unilateral Divorce Affects Children," IZA Discussion Papers 3342, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Martin Halla & Johann Scharler, 2012.
"Marriage, Divorce, and Interstate Risk Sharing,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(1), pages 55-78, 03.
- Martin Halla & Johann Scharler, 2008. "Marriage, Divorce and Interstate Risk Sharing," NRN working papers 2008-03, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Martin Halla & Johann Scharler, 2008. "Marriage, Divorce and Interstate Risk Sharing," Economics working papers 2008-16, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Halla, Martin & Scharler, Johann, 2008. "Marriage, Divorce and Interstate Risk Sharing," IZA Discussion Papers 3744, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Julio Cáceres-Delpiano & Eugenio Giolito, 2011.
"The Impact of Unilateral Divorce on Crime,"
ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers
inv269, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
- Cáceres-Delpiano, Julio & Giolito, Eugenio P., 2008. "The Impact of Unilateral Divorce on Crime," IZA Discussion Papers 3380, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Julio Cáceres-Delpiano & Eugenio Giolito, 2008. "The impact of unilateral divorce on crime," Economics Working Papers we081006, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Wolfers, Justin, 2003.
"Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results,"
1819, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Justin Wolfers, 2006. "Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1802-1820, December.
- Justin Wolfers, 2003. "Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results," NBER Working Papers 10014, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alessandra Voena, 2011. "Yours, Mine and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the Intertemporal Behavior of Married Couples?," Discussion Papers 10-022, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Audrey Light & Yoshiaki Omori, 2012. "Can Long-Term Cohabiting and Marital Unions be Incentivized?," Working Papers 12-01, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
- Langlais, Eric, 2009.
"On unilateral divorce and the "selection of marriages" hypothesis,"
14368, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Eric Langlais,, 2010. "On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 76(3), pages 229-256.
- Eric Langlais, 2010. "On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2010031, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Eric Langlais, 2009. "On unilateral divorce and the "selection of marriages" hypothesis," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-9, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
- Audrey Light & Yoshiaki Omori, 2009. "Economic Incentives and Family Formation," Working Papers 09-08, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
- González-Val, Rafael & Marcén, Miriam, 2012. "Unilateral divorce versus child custody and child support in the U.S," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 613-643.
- Fisher, H., 2011. "Divorce Property Division and the Decision to Marry or Cohabit," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1101, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RePEc Maintainer).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.