Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Marriage, Divorce and Interstate Risk Sharing

Contents:

Author Info

  • Halla, Martin

    ()
    (University of Linz)

  • Scharler, Johann

    ()
    (University of Innsbruck)

Abstract

In this paper we study the importance of marriage for interstate risk sharing. We find that US states in which married couples account for a higher share of the population are less exposed to state-specific output shocks. Thus, marriages do not just improve the allocation of risk at the individual level, but also have implications for the allocation of risk at the more aggregated state-level. Quantitatively, the impact of marriage on interstate risk sharing varies over divorce regimes.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp3744.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3744.

as in new window
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3744

Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org

Order Information:
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Email:

Related research

Keywords: risk sharing; marriage; divorce; family law;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Michael J. Brien, 1997. "Racial Differences in Marriage and the Role of Marriage Markets," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(4), pages 741-778.
  2. Stéphane Mechoulan, 2006. "Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American Family," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics tecipa-245, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  3. Ligon, Ethan & Thomas, Jonathan P & Worrall, Tim, 2002. "Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 209-44, January.
  4. Mathias Hoffmann & Iryna Shcherbakova, 2009. "Consumption Risk Sharing over the Business Cycle: the Role of Small Firms' Access to Credit Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 2544, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Ralph Chami & Gregory D. Hess, 2002. "For Better or For Worse? State-Level Marital Formation and Risk Sharing," CESifo Working Paper Series 702, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Lewis, Karen K, 1996. "What Can Explain the Apparent Lack of International Consumption Risk Sharing?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(2), pages 267-97, April.
  7. Betsey Stevenson, 2006. "The impact of divorce laws on marriage-specific capital," Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 2006-43, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  8. Mace, Barbara J, 1991. "Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 928-56, October.
  9. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1986. "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 437-54, June.
  10. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2007. "Marriage and divorce: changes and their driving forces," Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 2007-03, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  11. Rosenzweig, Mark R & Wolpin, Kenneth I, 1994. "Parental and Public Transfers to Young Women and Their Children," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1195-1212, December.
  12. Weiss, Y., 1992. "The Formation and Dissolution of Families: Why Marry? Who Marries Whom ? and What Happens Upon Marriage and Divorce," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center, Chicago - Economics Research Center 92-7, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
  13. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Avia Spivak, 1979. "The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market," NBER Working Papers 0362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Demyanyk, Yuliya & Ostergaard, Charlotte & Sorensen, Bent E, 2006. "US Banking Deregulation, Small Businesses and Interstate Insurance of Personal Income," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5863, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Imran Rasul, 2006. "Marriage Markets and Divorce Laws," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 30-69, April.
  16. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
  17. Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Wolpin, Kenneth I., 1984. "Specific Experience, Household Structure and Intergenerational Transfers: Farm Family Land and Labor Arrangements in Developing Countries," Bulletins, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center 8432, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
  18. Leora Friedberg, 1998. "Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data," NBER Working Papers 6398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Gregory D. Hess, 2004. "Marriage and Consumption Insurance: What's Love Got to Do with It?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 290-318, April.
  20. Allen, Douglas W, 1992. "Marriage and Divorce: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 679-85, June.
  21. Niko Matouschek & Imran Rasul, 2008. "The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(1), pages 59-110, 02.
  22. Asdrubali, Pierfederico & Sorensen, Bent E & Yosha, Oved, 1996. "Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: United States 1963-1990," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1081-1110, November.
  23. James Alm & Stacy Dickert-Conlin & Leslie A. Whittington, 1999. "Policy Watch: The Marriage Penalty," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 193-204, Summer.
  24. Rosenzweig, Mark R & Stark, Oded, 1989. "Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and Marriage: Evidence from Rural India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 905-26, August.
  25. Cochrane, John H, 1991. "A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 957-76, October.
  26. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages S11-S26, Part II, .
  27. Rosenzweig, Mark R., 1986. "Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low-Income Countries," Bulletins, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center 7518, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
  28. Justin Wolfers, 2003. "Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results," NBER Working Papers 10014, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Hunter, William C & Walker, Mary Beth, 1996. "The Cultural Affinity Hypothesis and Mortgage Lending Decisions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 57-70, July.
  30. Smith, James F, 1977. "The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974: A Cost/Benefit Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 609-22, May.
  31. Halla, Martin, 2007. "Divorce and the Excess Burden of Lawyers," IZA Discussion Papers 2962, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  32. repec:fth:coluec:443 is not listed on IDEAS
  33. Becker, Gary S & Landes, Elisabeth M & Michael, Robert T, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1141-87, December.
  34. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
  35. Boot, Arnoud W. A., 2000. "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 7-25, January.
  36. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1992. "Marriage and Divorce: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 687-93, June.
  37. Ladd, Helen F, 1982. "Equal Credit Opportunity: Women and Mortgage Credit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 166-70, May.
  38. Elliehausen, Gregory E & Lawrence, Edward C, 1990. "Discrimination in Consumer Lending," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 72(1), pages 156-60, February.
  39. Dan Anderberg, 2007. "Marriage, Divorce and Reciprocity-based Cooperation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(1), pages 25-47, 03.
  40. William C. Hunter & Mary Beth Walker, 1995. "The cultural affinity hypothesis and mortgage lending decisions," Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 95-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Tammi, Timo, 2013. "Dictator game giving and norms of redistribution: Does giving in the dictator game parallel with the supporting of income redistribution in the field?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 44-48.
  2. Donni, Olivier, 2014. "Over-investment in marriage-specific capital," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 34-43.
  3. Olivier Donni, 2012. "Overinvestment in Marriage-Specific Capital," THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise 2012-29, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3744. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.