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Exit and Voice in a Marriage Market

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Author Info
Akiko Maruyama () (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS))
Takashi Shimizu () (Faculty of Economics, Kansai University)
Kazuhiro Yamamoto () (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a model in which agents choose voice, exit, or stay options when their marital condition becomes bad. The "voice" option can be interpreted as a spouse's effort or "investment" in the household to resolve his/her dissatisfaction and improve the marital condition. If a spouse hopes to divorce, he/she chooses "exit" option. If a spouse does not hopes to express his/her opinion and to divorce, he/she chooses "stay" option. We focus on the role of "exit" and "voice" in a marriage and investigate the effects of divorce law which is based on fault or no-fault on divorce rates. Our paper shows that divorce rates tend to be too higher under unilateral divorce law in the non-transferable utility case. On the other hand, mutual-consent divorce law generates multiple equilibria and then divorce rates are inefficient even in the transferable utility case. In this multiple equilibria case, divorce rates are determined by social factors as culture, norm, and religion, etc.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 09-04.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2009
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Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:0904

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Web page: http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/
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Related research
Keywords: Exit; Voice; Divorce law;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
K0 - Law and Economics - - General
R2 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Household Analysis

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Leora Friedberg, 1998. "Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data," NBER Working Papers 6398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Niko Matouschek & Imran Rasul, 2008. "The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(1), pages 59-110, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher A, 1994. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 397-415, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Clark, Simon, 1999. "Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C41-54, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Betsey Stevenson, 2007. "The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-Specific Capital," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 75-94. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1986. "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 437-54, June.
  8. Marx, Leslie M. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1997. "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 219-245, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2006. "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 121(1), pages 267-288, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1992. "Marriage and Divorce: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 687-93, June.
  11. Justin Wolfers, 2006. "Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1802-1820, December. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Giulio Fella & Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2004. "Does Divorce Law Matter?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(4), pages 607-633, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Becker, Gary S & Landes, Elisabeth M & Michael, Robert T, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1141-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Allen, Douglas W, 1992. "Marriage and Divorce: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 679-85, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Imran Rasul, 2006. "Marriage Markets and Divorce Laws," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 30-69, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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