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Exit and Voice in a Marriage Market

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  • Akiko Maruyama

    ()
    (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS))

  • Takashi Shimizu

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, Kansai University)

  • Kazuhiro Yamamoto

    ()
    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

Abstract

In this paper, we present a model in which agents choose voice, exit, or stay options when their marital condition becomes bad. The "voice" option can be interpreted as a spouse's effort or "investment" in the household to resolve his/her dissatisfaction and improve the marital condition. If a spouse hopes to divorce, he/she chooses "exit" option. If a spouse does not hopes to express his/her opinion and to divorce, he/she chooses "stay" option. We focus on the role of "exit" and "voice" in a marriage and investigate the effects of divorce law which is based on fault or no-fault on divorce rates. Our paper shows that divorce rates tend to be too higher under unilateral divorce law in the non-transferable utility case. On the other hand, mutual-consent divorce law generates multiple equilibria and then divorce rates are inefficient even in the transferable utility case. In this multiple equilibria case, divorce rates are determined by social factors as culture, norm, and religion, etc.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 09-04.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:0904

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Web page: http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/
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Keywords: Exit; Voice; Divorce law;

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  1. Leora Friedberg, 1998. "Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data," NBER Working Papers 6398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  3. Giulio Fella & Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2002. "Does Divorce Law Matter?," Working Papers, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance 454, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  4. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
  5. Leslie M. Marx & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1066R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Betsey Stevenson, 2007. "The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-Specific Capital," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 75-94.
  7. Zelder, Martin, 1993. "Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case of No-Fault Divorce," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 503-20, June.
  8. Dale T. Mortensen & Christopher A. Pissarides, 1993. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," CEP Discussion Papers dp0110, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  9. Niko Matouschek & Imran Rasul, 2008. "The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(1), pages 59-110, 02.
  10. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2006. "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 121(1), pages 267-288, 02.
  11. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
  12. Allen, Douglas W, 1992. "Marriage and Divorce: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 679-85, June.
  13. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1992. "Marriage and Divorce: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 687-93, June.
  14. Justin Wolfers, 2006. "Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1802-1820, December.
  15. Simon Clark, 2004. "Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution," ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 32, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  16. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1986. "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 437-54, June.
  17. Becker, Gary S & Landes, Elisabeth M & Michael, Robert T, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1141-87, December.
  18. Imran Rasul, 2006. "Marriage Markets and Divorce Laws," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 30-69, April.
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