Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case of No-Fault Divorce
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 22 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/
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- Alessandro Cigno, 2011.
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