Does Divorce Law Matter?
AbstractIn this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 439.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2004, 2 (4), 607-633
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Other versions of this item:
- Giulio Fella & Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2004. "Does Divorce Law Matter?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 2(4), pages 607-633, 06.
- Giulio Fella & Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2002. "Does Divorce Law Matter?," Working Papers, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance 454, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
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