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Does the Welfare State Destroy the Family? Evidence from OECD Member Countries

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  • Martin Halla

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business)

  • Mario Lackner

    (Department of Economics, University of Linz)

  • Johann Scharler

    (Department of Economics, University of Innsbruck)

Abstract

We study the effect of the size of the welfare state on family outcomes in OECD member countries. Exploiting exogenous variation in public social spending, due to varying degrees of political fractionalization (i.e. the number of relevant parties involved in the legislative process), we show that an expansion in the welfare state increases the fertility, marriage, and divorce rates with a quantitatively stronger effect on the marriage rate. We conclude that the welfare state supports family formation. Nevertheless, we also find that the welfare state decouples marriage and fertility, and therefore, alters the organization of the family.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Vienna University of Economics, Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number wuwp150.

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Date of creation: Feb 2013
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Handle: RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp150

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Keywords: Marriage; divorce; fertility; welfare state; risk sharing;

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