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On unilateral divorce and the "selection of marriages" hypothesis

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Author Info
Eric Langlais

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Abstract

This paper revisits the issue of the unilateral divorce law, taking into account that: 1/ the decisions to engage in marriage and then to divorce or to stay married are fundamentally sequential decisions; 2/ household consumption has a large joint component, generating economies of scale. The unilateral divorce law is modelled through the combination of exclusive rights on the marriage dissolution and a monetary transfer to the parent having custody of the children. We analyze the influence of alternative compensation rules both in the short run (probability and efficiency of divorce) and in the long run (selection of marriages). We also show that a decrease in the costs of divorce proceedings has by no means commonplace consequences on marriage ontracting; particularly when consideration of parent's altruism and child support is introduced, more marriages are contracted when the cost of divorces decreases.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX in its series EconomiX Working Papers with number 2009-9.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2009-9

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Related research
Keywords: marriage models; unilateral divorce law; the parents'altruism and protective measures for children;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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  1. Katarina Nordblom, 2004. "Cohabitation and Marriage in a Risky World," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 325-340, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Smith, Ian, 1997. "Explaining the Growth of Divorce in Great Britain," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 44(5), pages 519-44, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2009. "Why Divorce Laws Matter: Incentives for Noncontractible Marital Investments under Unilateral and Consent Divorce," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 80-106, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2006. "Incentives to cooperate and the discretionary power of courts in divorce law," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 423-439, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rainer, Helmut, 2007. "Should we write prenuptial contracts?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 337-363, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Ted Bergstrom, 1996. "Economics in a Family Way," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1996B, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Brinig, Margaret F & Crafton, Steven M, 1994. "Marriage and Opportunism," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 869-94, June.
  8. Ellman, Ira Mark & Lohr, Sharon L., 1998. "Dissolving the relationship between divorce laws and divorce rates," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 341-359, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Clark, Simon, 1999. "Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C41-54, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Gray, Jeffrey S, 1998. "Divorce-Law Changes, Household Bargaining, and Married Women's Labor Supply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 628-42, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1986. "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 437-54, June.
  12. Parkman, Allen M., 1998. "Why Are Married Women Working So Hard?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 41-49, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Stéphane Mechoulan, 2006. "Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American Family," Working Papers tecipa-245, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Giulio Fella & Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2004. "Does Divorce Law Matter?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(4), pages 607-633, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Becker, Gary S & Landes, Elisabeth M & Michael, Robert T, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1141-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Weiss, Yoram & Willis, Robert J, 1997. "Match Quality, New Information, and Marital Dissolution," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages S293-329, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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