Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Effect of Time in a Multi-Dimensional Marriage Market Model

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mario Vozar

Abstract

In the paper, I develop a theoretical model of a marriage market that accounts for the effect of aging on agents’ wealth and physical attractiveness. Furthermore, I use the model to analyze how the structure and more importantly the stability of the marriage market is affected by the increased female income prospects. First, I find that the changes in agents’ characteristics can result in an incentive to re-match and thus provide yet another explanation of the phenomenon of divorce. Second, comparative statics show that an increase in female income prospects increases the divorce rate, which suggests that the stabilization effect of being more attractive for a current partner is dominated by the effect of increased female marriage market opportunities.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp417.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp417.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp417

Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 882, Politickych veznu 7, 111 21 Praha 1
Phone: (+420) 224 005 123
Fax: (+420) 224 005 333
Email:
Web page: http://www.cerge-ei.cz
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: aging; divorce; two-sided matching; Gale-Shapley marriage problem;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Tracy J. Cornelius, 2003. "A Search Model of Marriage and Divorce," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 135-155, January.
  2. Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1998. "Assortive Matching and Search," Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory 98-09, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  3. Dale Bremmer & Randy Kesselring, 2004. "Divorce and female labor force participation: Evidence from times-series data and cointegration," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(3), pages 175-190, September.
  4. Bergstrom, T. & Bagnoli, M., 1991. "Courtship as a waiting game," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 386, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. Clark Simon, 2006. "The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-28, December.
  6. Eeckhout, Jan, 2000. "On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-8, October.
  7. Adachi, Hiroyuki, 2003. "A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 182-198, December.
  8. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages S11-S26, Part II, .
  9. Lones Smith, 2006. "The Marriage Model with Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1124-1146, December.
  10. Gunter J. Hitsch & Ali Horta�su & Dan Ariely, 2010. "Matching and Sorting in Online Dating," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 130-63, March.
  11. Adrian Masters, 2008. "Marriage, Commitment and Divorce in a Matching Model with Differential Aging," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 614-628, July.
  12. Bjerk, David, 2009. "Beauty vs. earnings: Gender differences in earnings and priorities over spousal characteristics in a matching model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 248-259, March.
  13. Imran Rasul, 2006. "Marriage Markets and Divorce Laws," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 30-69, April.
  14. Burdett, Ken & Coles, Melvyn G, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 141-68, February.
  15. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp417. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jana Koudelkova).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.