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Partnership formation with age-dependent preferences

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  • Alpern, S.
  • Katrantzi, I.
  • Ramsey, D.M.

Abstract

We analyze a model of partnership formation in which players’ preferences are based on the age of a prospective partner. There are two classes of individuals, called for convenience here male and female. Males and females are fertile for the same length of time, normalized to one unit. A male enters the mating pool at age 0 and meets prospective partners according to a Poisson process. At equilibrium, he accepts a female if the utility from mating exceeds the expected utility from future search, which depends on the acceptance strategies of all males and females and the corresponding steady-state distribution of age in the pool of unmated individuals. Females face an analogous problem. Mating pairs are only formed by mutual consent and individuals leave the pool of unmated individuals on finding a mating partner or reaching the age of 1. A policy iteration algorithm is used to determine the equilibrium acceptance strategies and the corresponding steady-state distribution of the age of individuals in the mating pool. Two examples are presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Alpern, S. & Katrantzi, I. & Ramsey, D.M., 2013. "Partnership formation with age-dependent preferences," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 225(1), pages 91-99.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:225:y:2013:i:1:p:91-99
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.09.012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
    2. Lones Smith, 2006. "The Marriage Model with Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1124-1146, December.
    3. Burdett, Kenneth & Coles, Melvyn G, 1999. "Long-Term Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(456), pages 307-334, June.
    4. Ramsey, David M., 2008. "A large population job search game with discrete time," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 188(2), pages 586-602, July.
    5. Alpern, Steve & Katrantzi, Ioanna, 2009. "Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 196(3), pages 1214-1222, August.
    6. Kimmo Eriksson & Jonas Sjöstrand & Pontus Strimling, 2007. "Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 921-931, October.
    7. Vladimir Mazalov & Anna Falko, 2008. "Nash Equilibrium In Two-Sided Mate Choice Problem," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(04), pages 421-435.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alpern, Steve & Katrantzi, Ioanna & Ramsey, David, 2014. "Equilibrium population dynamics when mating is by mutual choice based on age," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 63-72.
    2. Anja Sautmann, 2017. "Age-Dependent Payoffs and Assortative Matching by Age in a Market with Search," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 263-294, May.

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