Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Non-Bayesian Updating: A Theoretical Framework

Contents:

Author Info

  • Larry G. Epstein

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Rochester)

  • Jawwad Noor

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Boston University)

  • Alvaro Sandroni

    ()
    (Kellogg School of Management)

Abstract

This paper models an agent in a multi-period setting who does not update according to Bayes? Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. Choice-theoretic axiomatic foundations are provided. Then the model is specialized axiomatically to capture updating biases that reflect excessive weight given to (i) prior be- liefs, or alternatively, (ii) the realized sample. Finally, the paper describes a counterpart of the exchangeable Bayesian model, where the agent tries to learn about parameters, and some answers are provided to the question what does a non-Bayesian updater learn?

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number WP2005-049.

as in new window
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2005-049

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215
Phone: 617-353-4389
Fax: 617-353-444
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Larry G. Epstein, 2006. "An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(2), pages 413-436.
  2. W. Pesendorfer & F. Gul, 1999. "Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  3. Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999. "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 119-160, September.
  4. Jawwad Noor, 2005. "Temptation, Welfare and Revealed Preference," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-15, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  5. Matthew Rabin, 1998. "Psychology and Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-46, March.
  6. Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Inference By Believers In The Law Of Small Numbers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 775-816, August.
  7. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
  8. Eddie Dekel, 1997. "A Unique Subjective State Space for Unforeseen Contingencies," Discussion Papers 1202, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Kogan, Leonid & Ross, Stephen & Wang, Jiang & Westerfield, Mark, 2003. "The Price Impact and Survival of Irrational Traders," Working papers 4293-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  10. W. Pesendorfer & F. Gul, 1999. "Temptation and Self-Control," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f1, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  11. Epstein, Larry G., 1983. "Stationary cardinal utility and optimal growth under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 133-152, October.
  12. Kopylov Igor, 2009. "Temptations in General Settings," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, September.
  13. Epstein, Larry G & Wang, Tan, 1996. ""Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1343-73, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Matthieu Segol, 2012. "Aggregation of information and beliefs on prediction markets with non-bayesian traders," Post-Print dumas-00809694, HAL.
  2. Riella, Gil, 2013. "Preference for Flexibility and Dynamic Consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2467-2482.
  3. Barton L. Lipman & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2010. "Temptation," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-021, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  4. Markus M. Mobius & Muriel Niederle & Paul Niehaus & Tanya S. Rosenblat, 2011. "Managing Self-Confidence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," NBER Working Papers 17014, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. André Lapied & Thomas Rongiconi, 2013. "Ambiguity as a Source of Temptation: Modeling Unstable Beliefs," AMSE Working Papers 1316, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.
  6. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2013. "Non-Bayesian optimal search and dynamic implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 121-125.
  7. Jadbabaie, Ali & Molavi, Pooya & Sandroni, Alvaro & Tahbaz-Salehi, Alireza, 2012. "Non-Bayesian social learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 210-225.
  8. Zhang, Hanzhe, 2013. "Evolutionary justifications for non-Bayesian beliefs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 198-201.
  9. Ali Jadbabaie & Pooya Molavi & Alvaro Sandroni & Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, 2009. "Non-Bayesian Social Learning, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-025, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 05 Aug 2011.
  10. Ertac, Seda, 2011. "Does self-relevance affect information processing? Experimental evidence on the response to performance and non-performance feedback," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 532-545.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2005-049. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Courtney Sullivan).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.