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An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating

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Abstract

This paper models an agent in a three-period setting who does not update according to Bayes'Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. The agent is rational in the sense that her dynamic behavior is derived from a single stable preference order on a domain of state-contingent menus of acts. A representation theorem generalizes the (dynamic version of) Anscombe-Aumann's theorem so that both the prior and the way in which it is updated are subjective.

Suggested Citation

  • Larry Epstein, 2005. "An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating," RCER Working Papers 521, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    • Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:521
    Note: Forthcoming in Review of Economic Studies
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayes' Rule; non-Bayesian updating; asset price volatility; no-trade theorems; agreeing to bet; common knowledge; temptation; self-control; conservatism; representativeness; overconfidence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics

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