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An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating

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  • Larry G. Epstein

Abstract

This paper models an agent in a three-period setting who does not update according to Bayes' Rule and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behaviour when formulating plans. Gul and Pesendorfer's theory of temptation and self-control is a key building block. The main result is a representation theorem that generalizes (the dynamic version of) Anscombe-Aumann's theorem so that both the prior and the way in which it is updated are subjective. The model can accommodate updating biases analogous to those observed by psychologists. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00381.x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 73 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 413-436

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Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:2:p:413-436

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  1. W. Pesendorfer & F. Gul, 1999. "Temptation and Self-Control," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f1, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  2. Klaus Nehring, 1999. "Preference for Flexibility in a Savage Framework," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 101-120, January.
  3. W. Pesendorfer & F. Gul, 1999. "Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  4. Ozdenoren, Emre, 2002. "Completing the State Space with Subjective States," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 531-539, August.
  5. Dekel, Eddie & Lipman, Barton L & Rustichini, Aldo, 2001. "Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 891-934, July.
  6. Laibson, David, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 443-77, May.
  7. Larry G. Epstein & Martin Schneider, 2001. "Recursive Multiple-Priors," RCER Working Papers 485, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  8. Joel L. Schrag, 1999. "First Impressions Matter: A Model Of Confirmatory Bias," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 37-82, February.
  9. Eddie Dekel & Barton Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, 2006. "Temptation–Driven Preferences," Discussion Papers 1423, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Matthew Rabin, 1998. "Psychology and Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-46, March.
  11. Paolo Ghirardato, 2002. "Revisiting Savage in a conditional world," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 83-92.
  12. Kopylov Igor, 2009. "Temptations in General Settings," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, September.
  13. Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, 2002. "Competing Theories of Financial Anomalies," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(2), pages 575-606, March.
  14. Geanakoplos, John, 1994. "Common knowledge," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 40, pages 1437-1496 Elsevier.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Larry Epstein & Jawwad Noor & Alvaro Sandroni, 2005. "Non-Bayesian Updating: a Theoretical Framework," RCER Working Papers 518, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  2. Jawwad Noor & Igor Kopylov, 2010. "Self-Deception and Choice," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-042, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  3. Riella, Gil, 2013. "Preference for Flexibility and Dynamic Consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2467-2482.
  4. Perea,Andrés, 2005. "A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision," Research Memorandum 034, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. André Lapied & Thomas Rongiconi, 2013. "Ambiguity as a Source of Temptation: Modeling Unstable Beliefs," AMSE Working Papers 1316, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.
  6. Zhang, Hanzhe, 2013. "Evolutionary justifications for non-Bayesian beliefs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 198-201.
  7. Sadowski, Philipp, 2013. "Contingent preference for flexibility: eliciting beliefs from behavior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
  8. Laibson, David I., 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," Scholarly Articles 4481499, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  9. Barton L. Lipman & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2010. "Temptation," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-021, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  10. Kalyan Chatterjee & R. Krishna, 2011. "On preferences with infinitely many subjective states," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 85-98, January.
  11. Andrés Perea, 2009. "A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 163-222, August.
  12. Takashi Hayashi, 2008. "Context dependence and consistency in dynamic choice under uncertainty: the case of anticipated regret," KIER Working Papers 659, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  13. Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "How (Not) to Do Decision Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000339, David K. Levine.
  14. Aurélien Baillon & Han Bleichrodt & Umut Keskin & Olivier L'Haridon & Author-Name: Chen Li, 2013. "Learning under ambiguity: An experiment using initial public offerings on a stock market," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201331, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  15. Sadowski, Philipp, 2008. "Conditional Preference for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior," MPRA Paper 8614, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Takashi Hayashi, 2011. "Context dependence and consistency in dynamic choice under uncertainty: the case of anticipated regret," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 399-430, April.
  17. Takeoka, Norio, 2007. "Subjective probability over a subjective decision tree," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 536-571, September.

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