Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

This paper models an agent in a three-period setting who does not update according to Bayes'Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. The agent is rational in the sense that her dynamic behavior is derived from a single stable preference order on a domain of state-contingent menus of acts. A representation theorem generalizes the (dynamic version of) Anscombe-Aumann's theorem so that both the prior and the way in which it is updated are subjective.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_498.pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: None

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 498.

as in new window
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2002
Date of revision: Jan 2005
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:498

Note: Revised January 2005
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

Related research

Keywords: Bayes' Rule; non-Bayesian updating; asset price volatility; no-trade theorems; agreeing to bet; common knowledge; temptation; self-control; conservatism; representativeness; overconfidence;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ozdenoren, Emre, 2002. "Completing the State Space with Subjective States," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 531-539, August.
  2. Kopylov Igor, 2009. "Temptations in General Settings," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, September.
  3. Matthew Rabin, 1998. "Psychology and Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-46, March.
  4. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001. "Temptation and Self-Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1403-1435, November.
  5. Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, 2005. "Temptation–Driven Preferences," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-005, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  6. Klaus Nehring, 1999. "Preference for Flexibility in a Savage Framework," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 101-120, January.
  7. Laibson, David, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 443-77, May.
  8. Paolo Ghirardato, 2002. "Revisiting Savage in a conditional world," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 83-92.
  9. Geanakoplos, John, 1994. "Common knowledge," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 40, pages 1437-1496 Elsevier.
  10. Dekel, Eddie & Lipman, Barton L & Rustichini, Aldo, 2001. "Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 891-934, July.
  11. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2004. "Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 119-158, 01.
  12. Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, 2002. "Competing Theories of Financial Anomalies," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(2), pages 575-606, March.
  13. Larry G. Epstein & Martin Schneider, 2001. "Recursive Multiple-Priors," RCER Working Papers 485, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Takeoka, Norio, 2007. "Subjective probability over a subjective decision tree," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 536-571, September.
  2. Sadowski, Philipp, 2013. "Contingent preference for flexibility: eliciting beliefs from behavior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
  3. Larry G. Epstein & Jawwad Noor & Alvaro Sandroni, 2005. "Non-Bayesian Updating: A Theoretical Framework," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-025, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  4. Perea,Andrés, 2005. "A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision," Research Memorandum 034, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Kalyan Chatterjee & R. Krishna, 2011. "On preferences with infinitely many subjective states," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 85-98, January.
  6. Laibson, David I., 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," Scholarly Articles 4481499, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  7. Sadowski, Philipp, 2008. "Conditional Preference for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior," MPRA Paper 8614, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Takashi Hayashi, 2008. "Context dependence and consistency in dynamic choice under uncertainty: the case of anticipated regret," KIER Working Papers 659, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  9. Igor Kopylov & Jawwad Noor, 2009. "Self-Deception and Choice," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000319, David K. Levine.
  10. Riella, Gil, 2013. "Preference for Flexibility and Dynamic Consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2467-2482.
  11. Barton L. Lipman & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2010. "Temptation," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-021, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  12. Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2010. "How (Not) to Do Decision Theory," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 257-282, 09.
  13. Takashi Hayashi, 2011. "Context dependence and consistency in dynamic choice under uncertainty: the case of anticipated regret," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(4), pages 399-430, April.
  14. André Lapied & Thomas Rongiconi, 2013. "Ambiguity as a Source of Temptation: Modeling Unstable Beliefs," Working Papers halshs-00797631, HAL.
  15. Zhang, Hanzhe, 2013. "Evolutionary justifications for non-Bayesian beliefs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 198-201.
  16. Andrés Perea, 2009. "A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 163-222, August.
  17. Aurélien Baillon & Han Bleichrodt & Umut Keskin & Olivier L'Haridon & Author-Name: Chen Li, 2013. "Learning under ambiguity: An experiment using initial public offerings on a stock market," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201331, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:498. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gabriel Mihalache).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.