A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
AbstractThe set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage of a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium payoffs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 78 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Bayesian game; Commitment; Contract; Incentive compatibility; Interim individual rationality;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2013. "Bayesian Repeated Games," Working Papers hal-00803919, HAL.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.