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Francoise Forges

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First Name: Francoise
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Last Name: Forges
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RePEc Short-ID: pfo80

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Homepage: http://sites.google.com/site/francoiseforges/
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Affiliation

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Works

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Working papers

  1. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Working Papers hal-00803919, HAL.
  2. Francoise Forges & Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2013. "Appariement: des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth," Working Papers hal-00822561, HAL.
  3. Francoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé, 2013. "Afriat's theorem for indivisible goods," Working Papers halshs-00870052, HAL.
  4. Forges, Françoise, 2013. "J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012) : Des jeux répétés a l'analyse "coùt-bénéfice"," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/11549, Paris Dauphine University.
  5. Forges, Françoise, 2013. "A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/11052, Paris Dauphine University.
  6. Minelli, Enrico & Forges, Françoise, 2013. "Corrigendum to “Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations”," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/12326, Paris Dauphine University.
  7. Francoise Forges & Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2013. "Appariement: des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth," Post-Print hal-00822561, HAL.
  8. Forges, Françoise & Iehlé, Vincent, 2012. "Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization," MPRA Paper 36519, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Francoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé, 2012. "Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization," Working Papers halshs-00727806, HAL.
  10. Forges, Françoise, 2012. "Correlated equilibria and communication in games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/171, Paris Dauphine University.
  11. Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 3360, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems," Working Papers 2011-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  13. Forges, Françoise, 2010. "Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5279, Paris Dauphine University.
  14. Omer Biran & Francoise Forges, 2010. "Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values," CESifo Working Paper Series 3067, CESifo Group Munich.
  15. Françoise Forges & Ram Orzach, 2010. "Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values," Working Papers 2010.119, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  16. Koessler, Frédéric & Forges, Françoise, 2008. "Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/564, Paris Dauphine University.
  17. Forges, Françoise, 2007. "Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la théorie des mécanismes," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/587, Paris Dauphine University.
  18. Forges, Françoise & Barbar, Riham, 2007. "Collusion dans les enchères : quelques apports des jeux coopératifs," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/158, Paris Dauphine University.
  19. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series 1686, CESifo Group Munich.
  20. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli, 2006. "Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets," CESifo Working Paper Series 1703, CESifo Group Munich.
  21. FORGES, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," CORE Discussion Papers 2006041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  22. Frederic Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2006. "Multistage communication with and without verifiable types," THEMA Working Papers 2006-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  23. Forges, Françoise, 2006. "Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/166, Paris Dauphine University.
  24. Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1669, CESifo Group Munich.
  25. Frederic Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2006. "Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification (Strategic Information Transmission and Certification)," THEMA Working Papers 2006-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  26. Forges, Françoise, 2005. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with and without indivisibilities," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/167, Paris Dauphine University.
  27. F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  28. F. Forges, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game," THEMA Working Papers 2002-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  29. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  30. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  31. F. Forges & J. F. Mertens & R. Vohra, 2000. "The Incentive Compatible Core of a Quasi-Linear Economy," THEMA Working Papers 2000-34, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  32. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  33. F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1999. "A note on the incentive compatible core," THEMA Working Papers 99-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  34. Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics," Papers 99-06, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  35. Forges, F., 1998. "Le coeur d'une economie d'echange en information asymetrique," Papers 9829, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  36. Forges, F., 1998. "Ex Post Individually Rational Trading Mechanisms," Papers 9810, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  37. Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Papers 9624, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  38. Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Papers 9605, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  39. O. De Wolf & F. Forges, 1996. "Rational Choice in Strategic Environments : Further Observations," THEMA Working Papers 96-23, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  40. Forges,F. & Minelli,E., 1995. "Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Papers 9518, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  41. DE WOLF , Olivier & FORGES , Françoise, 1995. "On Strategic Equilibria and Rational Choice," CORE Discussion Papers 1995048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  42. Forges, Françoise, 1994. "Différences d'information, solutions concurrentielles et stratégies révélatrices," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1994007, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  43. FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI , Enrico, 1994. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," CORE Discussion Papers 1994058, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  44. FORGES , Françoise, 1993. "Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," CORE Discussion Papers 1993009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  45. FORGES , Françoise, 1993. "A Note on Pareto Optimality in Differential Information Economies," CORE Discussion Papers 1993043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  46. Forges, F., 1991. "Posterior efficiency," CORE Discussion Papers 1991045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  47. Forges, F., 1991. "Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers 1991053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  48. FORGES, Françoise, 1990. "Sunspot equilibrium as a game-theoretical solution concept," CORE Discussion Papers 1990029, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  49. Forges, Françoise, 1990. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/66, Paris Dauphine University.
  50. Forges, F., 1990. "Some Thoughts on Efficiency and Information," CORE Discussion Papers 1990071, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  51. Francoise Forges, 1990. "Trading Games With Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 880, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  52. FORGES Françoise & THISSE Jacques-François, 1989. "Game Theory and Industrial Economics. An Introduction," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1989004, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  53. FORGES, Françoise, 1988. "Infinitely repeated games with incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers 1988006, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  54. FORGES, Françoise, 1988. "Non-zero sum repeated games and information transmission," CORE Discussion Papers 1988025, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  55. FORGES, Françoise, 1988. "Repeated games of incomplete information: non-zero-sum," CORE Discussion Papers 1988005, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  56. d'Aspremont, Claude & Mertens, Jean-François & Forges, Françoise, 1988. "Stratégies d'entreprises et avantages de la coopération : l'apport de la théorie des jeux," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/180, Paris Dauphine University.
  57. Forges, F., 1987. "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  58. Forges, F., 1987. "Can sunspots replace a mediator ?," CORE Discussion Papers 1987045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  59. Forges, F., 1986. "Negotiation without a deadline:a job market example," CORE Discussion Papers 1986039, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  60. Forges, F., 1984. "Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 2)," CORE Discussion Papers 1984011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  61. Forges, F., 1984. "Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 3)," CORE Discussion Papers 1984012, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  62. Forges, F., 1984. "Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 1)," CORE Discussion Papers 1984006, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  63. Forges, F., 1984. "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1984035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  64. FORGES, Françoise, . "Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information: symmetric case with random signals," CORE Discussion Papers RP -503, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  65. Forges, F. & Mertens, J.F. & Neyman, A., . "A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting," CORE Discussion Papers RP -673, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  66. Forges, F., . "Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -573, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  67. FORGES, Françoise, . "Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: a model with verifiable types," CORE Discussion Papers RP -700, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  68. FORGES, Françoise, . "Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -663, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  69. FORGES, Françoise, . "Communication equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -809, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  70. FORGES, Françoise, . "Correlated equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games," CORE Discussion Papers RP -883, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  71. FORGES, Françoise, . "Equilibria with communication in a job market example," CORE Discussion Papers RP -885, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

Articles

  1. Forges, Françoise & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
  2. Forges, Françoise, 2013. "A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 64-71.
  3. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Cooperative Games With Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1340009-1-1.
  4. Françoise Forges & Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2013. "Appariement : des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 123(5), pages 663-696.
  5. Françoise Forges & Vincent Iehlé, 2013. "Essential data, budget sets and rationalization," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 449-461, November.
  6. Forges, Françoise & Orzach, Ram, 2011. "Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 760-767.
  7. Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 52-64, September.
  8. Forges, Françoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2009. "Afriat's theorem for general budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 135-145, January.
  9. Frédéric Koessler & Françoise Forges, 2008. "Multistage Communication With And Without Verifiable Types," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(02), pages 145-164.
  10. Frédéric KOESSLER & Françoise FORGES, 2008. "Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 89, pages 3-61.
  11. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 1-35, November.
  12. Riham Barbar & Françoise Forges, 2007. "Collusion dans les enchères. Quelques apports des jeux coopératifs," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(5), pages 965-984.
  13. Françoise Forges, 2007. "Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la Théorie des Mécanismes," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 0(6), pages 873-890.
  14. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 403-419, April.
  15. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
  16. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
  17. Forges, Francoise, 2004. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 135-151, March.
  18. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
  19. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
  20. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2001. "A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 179-188, May.
  21. Aviad Heifetz & Françoise Forges & Enrico Minelli, 2001. "Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 349-365.
  22. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 292-310, November.
  23. De Wolf, Olivier & Forges, Francoise, 1998. " Rational Choice in Strategic Environments: Further Observations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(2), pages 529-35, June.
  24. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 388-406, August.
  25. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-175, February.
  26. Forges, Francoise & Peck, James, 1995. "Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-50, January.
  27. Forges Francoise, 1994. "Posterior Efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 238-261, March.
  28. Forges, Francoise, 1994. "A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 27-31, September.
  29. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-64, November.
  30. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-98, May.
  31. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 515, March.
  32. Forges, Francoise, 1988. "Can sunspots replace a mediator?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 347-368, September.
  33. Forges, F. & Mertens, J. F. & Neyman, A., 1986. "A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 7-7.
  34. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November.

Chapters

  1. Forges, Francoise, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 155-177 Elsevier.

Books

  1. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7238 edited by Forges, Françoise.

NEP Fields

25 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-CBA: Central Banking (1) 2010-12-18
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2013-11-16
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (6) 2010-11-06 2011-09-16 2012-01-25 2013-04-06 2013-11-16 2013-11-16. Author is listed
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (11) 2006-04-08 2006-04-08 2006-05-06 2006-06-03 2010-11-06 2011-09-16 2012-01-25 2013-05-24 2013-11-16 2013-11-16 2014-01-24. Author is listed
  5. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (7) 2010-11-06 2011-09-16 2012-01-25 2013-04-06 2013-05-24 2013-11-16 2014-01-24. Author is listed
  6. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (8) 2006-06-03 2011-09-16 2012-01-25 2012-02-20 2012-09-16 2013-04-06 2013-11-16 2014-01-24. Author is listed
  7. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (8) 2006-04-08 2006-04-22 2006-06-03 2006-09-30 2012-02-20 2012-09-16 2013-10-11 2014-01-24. Author is listed

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