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Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices

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  • Indrajit Ray

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2002-24.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-24

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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  1. Forges, F., 1987. "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
  3. Ma, Ching-to & Moore, John & Turnbull, Stephen, 1988. "Stopping agents from "cheating"," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 355-372, December.
  4. Gossner, Olivier, 1998. "Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/6244, Paris Dauphine University.
  5. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July.
  6. Dino Gerardi, 2002. "Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Lehrer, Ehud, 1996. "Mediated Talk," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 177-88.
  8. Robert J. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000377, David K. Levine.
  9. RAY , Indrajit, 1993. "Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium : A Definition," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1993053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August.
  11. Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Modeling Bounded Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "Repeated communication through the mechanism," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 41-60.
  13. Amparo Urbano & Jose Vila, 2004. "Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 283-320, January.
  14. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June.
  15. Ray, Indrajit, 1996. "Efficiency in correlated equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 157-178, December.
  16. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1998. "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 108-122, May.
  17. Ma, Ching-To, 1988. "Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 555-72, October.
  18. Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
  19. Gossner, Olivier, 1998. "Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 69-89, November.
  20. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1998. "- Unmediated Communication In Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1998-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  21. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
  22. Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas, 2001. "Repeated Communication Through the Mechanism And," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/6031, Paris Dauphine University.
  23. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 1997. "Pre-play communication and coordination in two-player games," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1997-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  24. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," Working Papers, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales 2007-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  2. Johne Bone & Michalis Drouvelis & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Coordination in 2 x 2 Games by Following Recommendations from Correlated Equilibria," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham 12-04r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  3. Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.

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