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Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-player Case

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Author Info
R. Vijay Krishna ()
Abstract

We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We show that any rational mediated communication mechanism satisfying a Nash domination condition can be implemented as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a communication extension of the original game and ends in finite time with probability 1.

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Paper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 125.

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Length: 19
Date of creation: Oct 2004
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Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:125

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  1. Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1989. "Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 238-263, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Simon, Robert Samuel, 2002. "Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 79-102, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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