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Sharing a long secret in a few public words Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics O. Gossner
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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number
2000-15.
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Date of creation: 2000Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2000-15Contact details of provider: Postal: 33, boulevard du port - 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex Phone: 33 1 34 25 60 63 Fax: 33 1 34 25 62 33 Email: Web page: http://www.u-cergy.fr/thema More information through EDIRC
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989.
"Cooperation and bounded recall ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
O. Gossner, 1999.
"Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players ,"
THEMA Working Papers
99-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Gossner, O., 1999.
"Repeated Games played by Cryptographically Sophesticated Players ,"
Papers
99-07, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998.
"Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1998035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!] Lehrer, Ehud, 1991.
"Internal Correlation in Repeated Games ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 431-56.
Other versions: Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992.
"Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
676, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Ben-Porath Elchanan, 1993.
"Repeated Games with Finite Automata ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Neyman, Abraham, 1985.
"Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986.
"Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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