1. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992. "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis," UCLA Economics Working Papers 676, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. Ehud Kalai, 1987. "Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 783, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
3. Stanford, William G., 1986. "Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 226-232, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
7. D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin., 1987. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8736, University of California at Berkeley.
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains," Working papers 499, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E., 1990. "Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 194-206, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Marschak, T A & Selten, Reinhard, 1978. "Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(1), pages 71-93, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov & Stanford, William, 1988. "A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 177-86.
12. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Alejandro Neme & Luis Quintas, 1988. "Equilibrium of Repeated Games With Cost of Implementation," Discussion Papers 763, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
14. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000731, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2114, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June. [Downloadable!]
2. V. Bhaskar & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1998. "Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria:Theoretical Foundations and Applications," Game Theory and Information 9809003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
3. Hamid Sabourian, 2000. "Bargaining and Markets: Complexity and the Walrasian Outcome," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1249, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
4. Douglas Gale & Hamid Sabourian, 2003. "Complexity and Competition, Part I: Sequential Matching," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000199, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Gale, D. & Sabourian, H., 2003. "Complexity and Competition, Part I: Sequential Matching," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0345, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]