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Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players

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  • O. Gossner

Abstract

We explore the consequences of the assumptions used in modern cryptographywhen applied to repeated games with public communication. Technically speaking, we model agents by polynomial Turing machinesand assume the existence of a trapdoor function. Under these conditions, we prove a Folk Theorem in which the minmax level of players has to be taken in correlated strategies instead of mixed strategies..

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 99-07.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:99-07

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  1. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1999. "- Unmediated Talk Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1999-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. Amparo Urbano & Penélope Hernández, 2001. "Communication And Automata," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2001-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  3. Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
  4. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
  5. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 1997. "Pre-play communication and coordination in two-player games," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1997-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  6. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
  7. Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1639, David K. Levine.
  8. FORGES, Françoise, . "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -914, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Ben-Porath Elchanan, 1993. "Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, February.
  10. Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004. "Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
  11. Binmore, Ken, 1988. "Modeling Rational Players: Part II," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 9-55, April.
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Cited by:
  1. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1998. "- Unmediated Communication In Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1998-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. O. Gossner, 2000. "Sharing a long secret in a few public words," THEMA Working Papers 2000-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "A Simple Model of Secure Public Communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 101-122, July.
  4. Gilad Bavly & Abraham Neyman, 2014. "Online Concealed Correlation and Bounded Rationality," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp659, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  5. Hubie Chen, 2013. "Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 593-611, August.
  6. Gilad Bavly & Abraham Neyman, 2003. "Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp336, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

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