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Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players

  • GOSSNER, Olivier

    ()

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

We explore the consequences of the assumptions used in modern cryptographywhen applied to repeated games with public communication. Technically speaking, we model agents by polynomial Turing machinesand assume the existence of a trapdoor function. Under these conditions, we prove a Folk Theorem in which the minmax level of players has to be taken in correlated strategies instead of mixed strategies..

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1998035.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 1998
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1998035
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  1. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-64, November.
  2. Amparo Urbano & Penélope Hernández, 2001. "Communication And Automata," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  3. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992. "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis," UCLA Economics Working Papers 676, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
  5. Binmore, Ken, 1988. "Modeling Rational Players: Part II," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 9-55, April.
  6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
  7. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 1997. "Pre-play communication and coordination in two-player games," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  8. Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
  9. Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004. "Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
  10. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1999. "- Unmediated Talk Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  11. Ben-Porath Elchanan, 1993. "Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, February.
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