Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players
We explore the consequences of the assumptions used in modern cryptographywhen applied to repeated games with public communication. Technically speaking, we model agents by polynomial Turing machinesand assume the existence of a trapdoor function. Under these conditions, we prove a Folk Theorem in which the minmax level of players has to be taken in correlated strategies instead of mixed strategies..
|Date of creation:||01 Jun 1998|
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- José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1998.
"- Unmediated Communication In Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
1998-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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UCLA Economics Working Papers
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- Forges, F., 1987.
CORE Discussion Papers
1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Amparo Urbano & Penélope Hernández, 2001. "Communication And Automata," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
- José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 1997. "Pre-play communication and coordination in two-player games," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Ariel Rubinstein, 1997.
"Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1639, David K. Levine.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
- Ben-Porath, E., 1991.
"Repeated games with Finite Automata,"
7-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Binmore, Ken, 1988. "Modeling Rational Players: Part II," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 9-55, April.
- José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1999. "- Unmediated Talk Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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