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Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players

  • O. Gossner

One of the main goals of bounded rationality models is to understand the limitations of agent's abilities in building representations of strategic situations as maximization problems and in solving these problems. Modern cryptography relies on the assumption that agents's computations should be implementable by polynominal Turing machines and on the exstence of a trapdoor function. Uder those assumption, we prove that very correlated equilibrium of the original infinitely repreated game can be implemented through public communication only.

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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 99-07.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:99-07
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  1. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-64, November.
  2. Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
  3. Binmore, Ken, 1988. "Modeling Rational Players: Part II," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 9-55, April.
  4. Ben-Porath, E., 1991. "Repeated games with Finite Automata," Papers 7-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
  6. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 1997. "Pre-play communication and coordination in two-player games," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  7. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1998. "- Unmediated Communication In Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  8. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
  9. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992. "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis," UCLA Economics Working Papers 676, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1999. "- Unmediated Talk Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  11. Amparo Urbano & Penélope Hernández, 2001. "Communication And Automata," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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