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Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players

Listed author(s):
  • O. Gossner

We explore the consequences of the assumptions used in modern cryptographywhen applied to repeated games with public communication. Technically speaking, we model agents by polynomial Turing machinesand assume the existence of a trapdoor function. Under these conditions, we prove a Folk Theorem in which the minmax level of players has to be taken in correlated strategies instead of mixed strategies..

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File URL: http://www.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents//99-07Gossner.pdf
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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 99-07.

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Date of creation: 1999
Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:99-07
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  1. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
  2. Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004. "Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
  3. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
  4. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 1997. "Pre-play communication and coordination in two-player games," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  5. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-1364, November.
  6. Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
  7. Binmore, Ken, 1988. "Modeling Rational Players: Part II," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 9-55, April.
  8. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
  9. Ben-Porath Elchanan, 1993. "Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, February.
  10. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1999. "- Unmediated Talk Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  11. Amparo Urbano & Penélope Hernández, 2001. "Communication And Automata," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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