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- Unmediated Talk Under Incomplete Information

Author

Listed:
  • José E. Vila

    (Universitat de València)

  • Amparo Urbano

    (Universitat de València)

Abstract

We show the role of unmediated plain conversation as both an information transmission and a coordination device for the class of two-player incomplete information games. Concretely, we proove that any communication equilibrium payoff of such games can be reached as a Nash equilibrium payoff of the game extended by a two phase (exante and interim) unmediated communication protocol. This protocol is constructed by using communicative one-way functions, which are, in turn, designed with the help of modern cryptographic tools. A familiar context in which our results could be applied is bilateral trading with incomplete information.

Suggested Citation

  • José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1999. "- Unmediated Talk Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1999-07
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    File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1999-07.pdf
    File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 1999
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    Cited by:

    1. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    2. GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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