Repeated Games played by Cryptographically Sophesticated Players
One of the main goals of bounded rationality models is to understand the limitations of agent's abilities in building representations of strategic situations as maximization problems and in solving these problems. Modern cryptography relies on the assumption that agents's computations should be implementable by polynominal Turing machines and on the exstence of a trapdoor function. Uder those assumption, we prove that very correlated equilibrium of the original infinitely repreated game can be implemented through public communication only.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Amparo Urbano & Penélope Hernández, 2001. "Communication And Automata," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986.
"Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1639, David K. Levine.
- Binmore, Ken, 1988. "Modeling Rational Players: Part II," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 9-55, April.
- FORGES, Françoise, .
CORE Discussion Papers RP
914, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1999. "- Unmediated Talk Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Ben-Porath, E., 1991.
"Repeated games with Finite Automata,"
7-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992.
"Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
676, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
- José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 1997. "Pre-play communication and coordination in two-player games," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1998.
"- Unmediated Communication In Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
1998-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004. "Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
- Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.