Sharing a long secret in a few public words
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 33, boulevard du port - 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex|
Phone: 33 1 34 25 60 63
Fax: 33 1 34 25 62 33
Web page: http://thema.u-cergy.fr
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- Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004.
"Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
- José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1998. "- Unmediated Communication In Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Lehrer, Ehud, 1991. "Internal Correlation in Repeated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(4), pages 431-456.
- Ehud Lehrer, 1988. "Internal Correlation in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 800, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
- Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992. "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis," UCLA Economics Working Papers 676, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
- GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," CORE Discussion Papers 1998035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Gossner, O., 1999. "Repeated Games played by Cryptographically Sophesticated Players," Papers 99-07, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- O. Gossner, 1999. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," THEMA Working Papers 99-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1639, David K. Levine.
- Ben-Porath Elchanan, 1993. "Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, February.
- Ben-Porath, E., 1991. "Repeated games with Finite Automata," Papers 7-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
- Amparo Urbano & Penélope Hernández, 2001. "Communication And Automata," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)