Sharing a long secret in a few public words
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 33, boulevard du port - 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex|
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- Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004.
"Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
- José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1998. "- Unmediated Communication In Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Ben-Porath Elchanan, 1993.
"Repeated Games with Finite Automata,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, February.
- GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998.
"Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1998035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- O. Gossner, 1999. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," THEMA Working Papers 99-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Gossner, O., 1999. "Repeated Games played by Cryptographically Sophesticated Players," Papers 99-07, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
- Lehrer, Ehud, 1991.
"Internal Correlation in Repeated Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 431-56.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 1997.
"Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1639, David K. Levine.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
- Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992.
"Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
676, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
- Amparo Urbano & Penélope Hernández, 2001. "Communication And Automata," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
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