Two-person repeated games with finite automata
AbstractWe study two-person repeated games in which a player with a restricted set of strategies plays against an unrestricted player. An exogenously given bound on the complexity of strategies, which is measured by the size of the smallest automata that implement them, gives rise to a restriction on strategies available to a player. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the set of equilibrium payoffs as the bound on the strategic complexity of the restricted player tends to infinity, but sufficiently slowly. Results from the study of zero sum case provide the individually rational payoff levels.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 29 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received February 1997/revised version March 2000
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- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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