• NEP-ALL-2001-05-02 (All new papers)
• NEP-MIC-2001-05-02 (Microeconomics)

1. Bhaskar, V, 1998. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 135-49, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Bhaskar, V., 1994. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," Papers 9485, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
2. George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2107, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," CARESS Working Papres almost-pub, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, revised 01 Sep 2000. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2000. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0661, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   • George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000257, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
   • George Mailath & Stephen Morris, . ""Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring''," CARESS Working Papres 99-09, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1999. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1236, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • George Mailath & Stephen Morris, . "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6bf0f633ff55148107994e092, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
   • Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 189-228, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1479R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
   • Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September. [Downloadable!]
2. George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
3. Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme, 2004. "Time Dependent Bounded Recall Strategies Are Enough to Play the Discounted Repeated Prisoners Dilemma," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp449, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Mehmet Barlo & Guilherme Carmona, 2004. "Time Dependent Bounded Recall Strategies Are Enough to Play the Discounted Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 0405006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
4. Ted Temzelides & Jialin Yu, 2001. "On Money as a Substitute for Perfect Recall," Macroeconomics 0012020, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
5. George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
6. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 843644000000000079, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]