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Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics George J. Mailath () (Department of Economics)
: Wojciech Olszewski () (Department of Economics, Northwestern University)
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registered author(s):
A strategy profile in a repeated game has bounded recall L if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure towards private monitoring (the case of almost-public monitoring), while strict equilibria in unbounded-recall strategies are typically not robust. We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. That is, the same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium when the monitoring is perturbed from perfect to highly-correlated private.
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Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number
08-027.
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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 30 May 2008Date of revision:
28 Jul 2008Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:08-027Contact details of provider: Postal: 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 Phone: 215-898-9992 Fax: 215-573-2378 Email: Web page: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/pier More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Repeated games ; bounded recall strategies ; folk theorem ; imperfect monitoring ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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