Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
AbstractI consider repeated games with local monitoring: each player observes his neighbors’ moves only. Hence, monitoring is private and imperfect. Communication is private: each player can send different (costless) messages to different players. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I prove that a folk theorem holds if and only if each player has two neighbors. This extends the result of Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) to private communication, provided the existence of sequential equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 120 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Communication; Folk theorem; Imperfect private monitoring; Networks; Repeated games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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