Cooperation and Collective Enforcement in Networked Societies
AbstractWe endogenize social network formation and collective enforcement using a model in which players interact bilaterally and repeatedly along costly links. Cooperation is supported by the threat of collective punishments that spread through the network. Optimal networks are attainable in equilibrium. When the society is homogeneous, the optimal network consists of many separate cliques. Introducing heterogeneous match quality gives rise to more realistic âsmall worldsâ networks, with connectedness, small distances, and high clustering.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2008 Meeting Papers with number 970.
Date of creation: 2008
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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