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Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring

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    Abstract

    This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases.

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    File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2010/10073.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number 10073.

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    Length: 34 pages
    Date of creation: Sep 2010
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10073

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    Keywords: Finitely repeated games; semi-standard monitoring; folk theorem.;

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