Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information
AbstractThis paper studies the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions in which there is a trade-off between (i) the short-run gain of using information, and (ii) the long-run gain of concealing it. We implement simple examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information. While the empirical value of information does not always coincide with the theoretical prediction, the qualitative properties of the value of information are satisfied in the laboratory: (i) it is never negative, (ii) it decreases with the number of repetitions, (iii) it is bounded below by the value of the infinitely repeated game, and (iv) it is bounded above by the value of the one-shot game. In line with the theory, the empirical use of private information is almost complete when it should be, and decreases in longer interactions.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 78 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Concealment of information; Laboratory experiments; Value of information; Zero-sum repeated games;
Other versions of this item:
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11002, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2013. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Post-Print halshs-00773412, HAL.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
- Nick Feltovich, 2000. "Reinforcement-Based vs. Belief-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 605-642, May.
- Ananish Chaudhuri, 1997.
"The Ratchet Principle in a Principal Agent Game with Unknown Costs: An Experimental Analysis,"
Departmental Working Papers
199608, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Chaudhuri, Ananish, 1998. "The ratchet principle in a principal agent game with unknown costs: an experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, November.
- Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009.
NBER Working Papers
15540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan P. Thomas & Martin Cripps, 2000.
"Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information,"
Game Theory and Information
- Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan Thomas, 2004. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," ESE Discussion Papers 76, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008.
"Long persuasion games,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 1-35, November.
- Koessler, Frédéric & Forges, Françoise, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/179, Paris Dauphine University.
- Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1669, CESifo Group Munich.
- Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," THEMA Working Papers 2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Ichiro Obara, 2007.
"Folk Theorem with Communication,"
784828000000000351, UCLA Department of Economics.
- S. Hart & A. Mas-Collel, 2010.
"A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
572, David K. Levine.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1996. "A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 200, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1996.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9703006, EconWPA, revised 24 Mar 1997.
- Feltovich, Nick, 1999. "Equilibrium and reinforcement learning in private-information games: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 1605-1632, September.
- Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004.
"Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
- Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6103, Paris Dauphine University.
- Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003.
"Long Cheap Talk,"
Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
- HART, Sergiu, . "Nonzerosum two-person repeated games with incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -636, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- George Loewenstein & Don Moore & Roberto Weber, 2006. "Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 281-295, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.