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Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games

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  • Renault, Jerome

    ()

  • Solan, Eilon

    ()

  • Vieille, Nicolas

    ()

Abstract

We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 966.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 15 Sep 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0966

Note: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2229960
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Postal: HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex, France
Web page: http://www.hec.fr/
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Keywords: sender-receiver; dynamic games; bayesian games; communication; repeated games;

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References

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  1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2010. "Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1511, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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  5. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp284, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
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  9. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
  10. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "Contracting for Information under Imperfect Commitment," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt4010c6w9, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  11. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion with persistent cost shocks," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0405-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  12. Johannes Hörner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2011. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 79(4), pages 1277-1318, 07.
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Cited by:
  1. Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2013. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 13-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  2. Chandrasekher, Madhav, 0. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society.

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