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On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information

Author

Listed:
  • Johannes Hörner

    (Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520)

  • Dinah Rosenberg

    (Department of Economics and Decision Sciences, HEC Paris, and GREGHEC, Paris, France)

  • Eilon Solan

    (School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel)

  • Nicolas Vieille

    (Department of Economics and Decision Sciences, HEC Paris, and GREGHEC, Paris, France)

Abstract

We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an example of Aumann and Maschler [Aumann, R. J., M. B. Maschler. 1995. Repeated Games with Incomplete Information . MIT Press, Cambridge, MA]. We determine the value and identify the optimal strategies for a range of parameters.

Suggested Citation

  • Johannes Hörner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 58(4-part-2), pages 1107-1115, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:58:y:2010:i:4-part-2:p:1107-1115
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.1100.0829
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Phelan, Christopher, 2006. "Public trust and government betrayal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 27-43, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    2. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Rainer, Catherine & Solan, Eilon, 2020. "Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 83-104.
    3. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
    4. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013. "Dynamic sender–receiver games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 502-534.
    5. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017. "Optimal dynamic information provision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 329-349.
    6. Kolb, Aaron M., 2015. "Optimal entry timing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 973-1000.

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