Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 17 (1985)
Issue (Month): 1-2 ()
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- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2002. "How to Auction an Essential Facility When Underhand Integration is Possible," Working Papers 839, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
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