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Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem

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  • Johannes Hörner
  • Takuo Sugaya
  • Satoru Takahashi
  • Nicolas Vieille

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 79 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (07)
Pages: 1277-1318

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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:79:y:2011:i:4:p:1277-1318

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Cited by:
  1. Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013. "Dynamic sender–receiver games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 502-534.
  2. Wiseman, Thomas & Peski, Marcin, 0. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  3. Thomas Fagart, 2011. "Collusion in an investment game," Post-Print dumas-00643721, HAL.
  4. Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Barlo, Mehmet & Urgun, Can, 2011. "Stochastic discounting in repeated games: Awaiting the almost inevitable," MPRA Paper 28537, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Drew Fudenberg & Yuhta Ishii & Scott Duke Kominers, 2012. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000390, David K. Levine.
  7. Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1848, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
  9. Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000423, David K. Levine.
  10. Mathias Staudigl, 2013. "A limit theorem for Markov decision processes," Working Papers 475, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  11. John Duggan, 2013. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Elections with Adverse Selection," Wallis Working Papers WP64, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  12. Du, Chuang, 2012. "Solving payoff sets of perfect public equilibria: an example," MPRA Paper 38622, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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