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The minority game: An economics perspective

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Willemien Kets

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Abstract

This paper gives a critical account of the minority game literature. The minority game is a simple congestion game: players need to choose between two options, and those who have selected the option chosen by the minority win. The learning model proposed in this literature seems to differ markedly from the learning models commonly used in economics. We relate the learning model from the minority game literature to standard game-theoretic learning models, and show that in fact it shares many features with these models. However, the predictions of the learning model differ considerably from the predictions of most other learning models. We discuss the main predictions of the learning model proposed in the minority game literature, and compare these to experimental findings on congestion games.

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File URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/0706.4432
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Paper provided by arXiv.org in its series Quantitative Finance Papers with number 0706.4432.

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Date of creation: Jun 2007
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Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:0706.4432

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