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Coordination and self-organization in minority games: experimental evidence

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  • Giulio Bottazzi

    ()

  • Giovanna Devetag

    ()

Abstract

This work presents experimental results on a coordination game in which agents must repeatedly choose between two sides, and a positive fixed payoff is assigned only to agents who pick the minoritarian side. The game presents a variety of asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, and a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which agents randomize between the two sides at every stage. The game reflects some essential features of those economic situations in which positive rewards are assigned to individuals who behave in opposition to the modal behavior in a population. We conduct laboratory experiments in which stationary groups of five players play the game for 100 periods, and manipulate two treatment variables: the amount of "memory" M that players have regarding the game history (i.e., the length of the string of past outcomes that players can see on the screen while choosing), and the amount of information about other players' past choices: in the aggregate information treatment, players only know which side was the minority side at each period, while in the full information treatment players have information regarding the entire distribution of choices in the group at each round. We first analyze aggregate results in terms of both "allocative" and "informational" efficiency. We then analyze individual behavior in the game as compared to the theoretical benchmark provided by the mixed strategy equilibrium solution. Our results show that, first, both allocative and informational efficiency are higher on average than the benchmark value corresponding to the mixed strategy equilibrium in all treatments, suggesting that a quite remarkable degree of coordination is achieved; second, providing players with full information about other players' choice distribution does not appear to improve efficiency significantly. At the individual level, a substantial portion of subjects exhibit `inertial' behavior, i.e., the tendency to replicate t

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia in its series CEEL Working Papers with number 0215.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpce:0215

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Related research

Keywords: Experimental Economics; Expectations; Coordination; Asset pricing;

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References

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  1. Sundali, James A. & Rapoport, Amnon & Seale, Darryl A., 1995. "Coordination in Market Entry Games with Symmetric Players," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 203-218, November.
  2. Challet, D. & Zhang, Y.-C., 1997. "Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 246(3), pages 407-418.
  3. Arthur, W Brian, 1994. "Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 406-11, May.
  4. Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport, 2002. "Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 253-272, December.
  5. J. B. Van Huyck & R. C. Battalio & R. O. Beil, 2010. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000393, David K. Levine.
  6. John Duffy & Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Learning, Information and Sorting in Market Entry Games: Theory and Evidence," ESE Discussion Papers 78, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  7. Rapoport, Amnon & Boebel, Richard B., 1992. "Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 261-283, April.
  8. Challet, Damien & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 1998. "On the minority game: Analytical and numerical studies," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 256(3), pages 514-532.
  9. Ochs, Jack, 1990. "The Coordination Problem in Decentralized Markets: An Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 545-59, May.
  10. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Paolo Laureti & Peter Ruch & Joseph Wakeling & Yi-Cheng Zhang, 2004. "The Interactive Minority Game: a Web based investigation of human market interactions," Experimental 0402004, EconWPA.
  2. Kets, W., 2007. "The Minority Game: An Economics Perspective," Discussion Paper 2007-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco & Renault, Jérôme, 2008. "Discounted and Finitely Repeated Minority Games with Public Signals," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/2347, Paris Dauphine University.

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