Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

A laboratory experiment on the minority game

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bottazzi, Giulio
  • Devetag, Giovanna

Abstract

This work presents experimental results on a coordination game in which agents must repeatedly choose between two sides, and a positive fixed payoff is assigned only to agents who pick the minoritarian side. We conduct laboratory experiments in which stationary groups of five players play the game for 100 periods, and manipulate two treatment variables: the amount of ‘memory’ M that players have regarding the game history (i.e., the length of the string of past outcomes that players can see on the screen while choosing) and the amount of information about other players’ past choices. Our results show that, at the aggregate level, a quite remarkable degree of coordination is achieved. Moreover, providing players with full information about other players’ choice distribution does not appear to improve efficiency significantly.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437102018939
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only. Journal offers the option of making the article available online on Science direct for a fee of $3,000

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications.

Volume (Year): 324 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 124-132

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:324:y:2003:i:1:p:124-132

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/physica-a-statistical-mechpplications/

Related research

Keywords: Minority game; Experimental economics; Coordination and self-organization;

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Linde, Jona & Sonnemans, Joep & Tuinstra, Jan, 2014. "Strategies and evolution in the minority game: A multi-round strategy experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 77-95.
  2. Jan Tuinstra & Pietro Dindo, 2006. "A Behavioral Model for Participation Games with Negative Feedback," Working Papers wp06-15, Warwick Business School, Finance Group.
  3. repec:dgr:uvatin:2013043 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Pietro Dindo & Jan Tuinstra, 2011. "A Class of Evolutionary Models for Participation Games with Negative Feedback," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 37(3), pages 267-300, March.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:324:y:2003:i:1:p:124-132. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.