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Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Duffy, John
Hopkins, Ed
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior .
Volume (Year): 51 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 31-62
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:51:y:2005:i:1:p:31-62Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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