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Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher M. Anderson

    (Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA)

  • Colin F. Camerer

    (Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA)

Abstract

We apply Camerer and Ho's experience-weighted attraction (EWA) model of learning to extensive-form signaling games. Since these games often have many equilibria, logical `refinements' have been used to predict which equilibrium will occur. Brandts and Holt conjectured that belief formation could lead to less refined equilibria, and confirmed their conjecture experimentally. Our adaptation of EWA to signaling games includes a formalization of the Brandts-Holt belief formation idea as a special case. We find that the Brandts-Holt dynamic captures the direction of switching from one strategy to another, but does not capture the rate at which switching occurs. EWA does better at predicting the rate of switching (and also forecasts better than reinforcement models). Extensions of EWA which update unchosen signals by different functions of the set of unobserved foregone payoffs further improve predictive accuracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher M. Anderson & Colin F. Camerer, 2000. "Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(3), pages 689-718.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:16:y:2000:i:3:p:689-718
    Note: Received: April 26, 1999; revised version: April 25, 2000
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. José Luis Lima R. & Javier Nuñez E., 2004. "Experimental Analysis of the Reputational Incentives in a Self Regulated Organization," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 194, Econometric Society.
    2. Floris Heukelom, 2007. "Who are the Behavioral Economists and what do they say?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-020/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Drouvelis, M. & Müller, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior : An Experiment," Discussion Paper 2009-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Wu, Zhaoyuan & Zhou, Ming & Zhang, Ting & Li, Gengyin & Zhang, Yan & Liu, Xiaojuan, 2020. "Imbalance settlement evaluation for China's balancing market design via an agent-based model with a multiple criteria decision analysis method," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    5. Drouvelis, M. & Müller, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior : An Experiment," Discussion Paper 2009-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Alex Possajennikov, 2018. "Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(3), pages 483-505, May.
    7. Church, Bryan K. & Peytcheva, Marietta & Yu, Wei & Singtokul, Ong-Ard, 2015. "Perspective taking in auditor–manager interactions: An experimental investigation of auditor behavior," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 40-51.
    8. Duffy, John & Hopkins, Ed, 2005. "Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 31-62, April.
    9. Claude Meidinger, 2018. "Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games," Post-Print halshs-01960762, HAL.
    10. Claude Meidinger, 2018. "Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 18036, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    11. Amrish Patel & Edward Cartwright, 2009. "Social Norms and Naive Beliefs," Studies in Economics 0906, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    12. AJ A. Bostian & Charles A. Holt & Angela M. Smith, 2008. "Newsvendor "Pull-to-Center" Effect: Adaptive Learning in a Laboratory Experiment," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 590-608, July.
    13. Drouvelis, Michalis & Müller, Wieland & Possajennikov, Alex, 2012. "Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 102-119.
    14. Claude Meidinger, 2018. "Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01960762, HAL.
    15. Teck H. Ho & Xin Wang & Colin F. Camerer, 2008. "Individual Differences in EWA Learning with Partial Payoff Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 37-59, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Learning; Game theory experiments; Signaling games; Equilibrium refinement.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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