Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games
AbstractWe apply Camerer and Ho's experience-weighted attraction (EWA) model of learning to extensive-form signaling games. Since these games often have many equilibria, logical `refinements' have been used to predict which equilibrium will occur. Brandts and Holt conjectured that belief formation could lead to less refined equilibria, and confirmed their conjecture experimentally. Our adaptation of EWA to signaling games includes a formalization of the Brandts-Holt belief formation idea as a special case. We find that the Brandts-Holt dynamic captures the direction of switching from one strategy to another, but does not capture the rate at which switching occurs. EWA does better at predicting the rate of switching (and also forecasts better than reinforcement models). Extensions of EWA which update unchosen signals by different functions of the set of unobserved foregone payoffs further improve predictive accuracy.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 16 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: April 26, 1999; revised version: April 25, 2000
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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- Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Mueller & Alex Possajennikov, 2009.
"Signaling without common prior: An experiment,"
2009-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Drouvelis, M. & Müller, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment," Discussion Paper 2009-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Mueller & Alex Possajennikov, 2009. "Signaling without common prior: An experiment," Discussion Papers 2009-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Muller & Alex Possajennikov, 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment," Discussion Papers 09/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Floris Heukelom, 2007. "Who are the Behavioral Economists and what do they say?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-020/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Drouvelis, Michalis & Müller, Wieland & Possajennikov, Alex, 2012. "Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 102-119.
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